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Comments
Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Engineering, Inc.:
The On-Sale Bar to Patentability and
Executory Sales Offers
The United States patent laws grant an inventor the exclu-
sive right to exploit an invention in exchange for a public dis-
closure of the invention.' To obtain a valid patent, the inventor
must comply with conditions prescribed by Congress. 2 Among
these conditions, the "on-sale bar" precludes patent rights to in-
ventors who place their inventions on sale in the United States
more than one year before applying for a patent.3 When an in-
1. The United States Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have
power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In general, the patent
laws are codified under title 35 of the United States Code. Under these laws,
an inventor obtains the patent grant in exchange for the disclosure of the in-
vention to the public and the public's right to use the invention after the grant
expires. The disclosure must be sufficient enough to enable a skilled person to
make and use the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (detailing the required
disclosures). The inventor's application for patent, filed with the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), contains this "enabling disclosure" of the invention
and includes, if necessary, specifications, drawings, models, and specimens. See
id. §§ 111-14. The invention is not disclosed to the public unless and until the
PTO issues the patent grant. See id. § 122. Upon issuing a patent, the PTO
ensures public disclosure of the invention by furnishing the public with certi-
fied copies of specifications and drawings. See id. § 10.
2. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1988) (describing which inventions
are patentable and the conditions for patentability).
3. Specifically, the patent laws provide: "A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless the invention was ... on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States." I&
§ 102(b).
Much has been written on the topic of the on-sale bar to patentability. See
generally Choate, "On Sale" - Review and Circumspection, 47 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 906 (1965); Colnan, A More Sophisticated Standard for the "On Sale"
Provision of Section 102(b), 53 J. PAT. OFF. Sof'y 674 (1971); Garrett, Com-
ment: Reduction to Practice and the On Sale Bar, 69 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 581
(1987); Pigott, The Concepts of Public Use and Sale, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Socy 399
(1967); Rooklidge, Application of the On-Sale Bar to Activities Performed
Before Reduction to Practice, 72 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 543 (1990); Rooklidge &
von Hoffmann, Reduction to Practice, Experimental Use, and the "On Sale"
and "Public Use" Bars to Patentability, 63 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 1 (1988); Schnei-
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ventor fails to apply for a patent within one year of first selling
and delivering the invention, the on-sale bar is easy to apply:
The actual sale is "smoking gun" evidence that the inventor
placed the invention on sale before the "critical date."4 Once
proven, "on-sale" status triggers application of the on-sale bar,
which denies any valid, enforceable patent rights for the
inventor.
The on-sale bar, however, does not require an actual sale;
an offer for sale is sufficient.5 When the invention owner
makes an offer to sell the invention before the critical date, and
the terms of the offer provide for delivery after the critical
date, application of the on-sale bar becomes much more diffi-
cult. The invention owner is often the only party who knows
whether he or she is offering the new invention. In addition,
the invention owner may make an offer that does not lead to a
sale. Consequently, offers to enter into executory sales con-
tracts pose special problems for the courts.6
der, The On Sale Statutory Bar, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 619 (1974); Shurn,
Through the Public Policy Looking Glass of the On-Sale Bar - And What the
Federal Circuit Found There, 29 IDEA, J. LAW & TEcH. 199 (1989); West &
Linck, The Law of "Public Use" and "On Sale" Pas Presen and Future, 72
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 114 (1990); Zieg, Developments in the Law of "On Sale;" 58
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 470 (1976); Note, New Guidelines for Applying the On Sale
Bar to Patentability, 24 STAN. L. REV. 730 (1972) [hereinafter Note, New
Guidelines]; Note, The "On Sale" Provision as a Bar to Patentability, 27 U.
PITT. L. REV. 887 (1966) [hereinafter Note, "On Sale" Provision]; Note, UMC
Electronics v. United States: Should Reduction to Practice be a Requirement
of the On Sale Bar?, 12 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. 131 (1988) [hereinafter Note,
UMC Electronics].
4. The term "critical date" is shorthand for the statement "more than
one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States,"
which appears in the patent statute. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). The "critical
date" is thus determined retrospectively from the date of application.
5. See, e.g., A.B. Chance Co. v. RTE Corp., 854 F.2d 1307, 1311, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1884 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("A single offer to sell is epough
to bar patentability whether or not the offer is accepted."); Buildex, Inc. v.
Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1464, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1325, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) ("the existence of a sales contract... has been held to demonstrate
an 'on sale' status for the invention"); UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816
F.2d 647, 653, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("An offer to sell
a later-claimed invention may be sufficient to invoke the bar whether the offer
is accepted or rejected." (emphasis in original)), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1025
(1988); see also 2 D. CHsUM, PATENTs: A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF PATENTA-
BILIY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 6.02 [6J[a] n.6 (1990) [hereinafter
CHISUM ON PATENTS] (citing extensive list of cases holding that an offer to sell
is sufficient to invoke the on-sale bar).
6. The noted commentator and author of the leading casebook on patent
law, Robert A. Choate, identified the problems of the executory sales offer sit-
uation as early as 1965. Professor Choate remarked that "[t]here has been
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, 7 has
addressed repeatedly the on-sale bar issue involving offers to
enter into executory sales contracts.8 The increasing complex-
ity and cost of technology development may explain partially
the recurrent nature of this issue.9 Better explanations, how-
more difficulty and confusion in situations where goods were not on hand
ready for sale and delivery at the time the offer for sale was made." Choate,
supra note 3, at 911.
7. In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.), in part to promote predictability, uniformity, and the efficient admin-
istration of patent law. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMXN. NEws 11, 12-13. To achieve these goals,
Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
See generally Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1989) (noting that despite the unresolved na-
ture of the debate over the propriety of specialized courts, Congress decided to
embark on a sustained experiment in specialization with the creation of the
Federal Circuit); Note, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 301 (1984) (analyzing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of a specialized patent court and concluding that although the creation of
the Federal Circuit will foster greater uniformity in the patent law, a decrease
in forum shopping, and lower litigation costs, it will fail to spur innovation and
may fail to reduce federal appellate caseloads). Congress gave the Federal Cir-
cuit exclusive jurisdiction "of an appeal from a final decision of a district court
of the United States... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or
in part, on section 1338 [of title 28]." 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988). Section
1338(a) gives the United States district courts exclusive jurisdiction over "any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents." l § 1338.
8. For instance, the only three 1990 Federal Circuit Court cases involving
the on-sale bar issue were cases where the sale activity consisted of an offer to
enter into an executory sales contract. See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount
Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1592 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(sale activity was an offer, made before the critical date, to deliver and con-
struct an improved highway rest area lighting pole where delivery was to be
completed and payment made after the critical date), qffg in part and rev'g
in part 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States Envtl. Prods.,
Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 716, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898, 1900-01 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (offer to deliver sludge dewatering system to city was made before the
critical date and delivery was completed after the critical date); Envirotech
Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1572-73, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230,
1231-32 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (offer was made before the critical date to deliver a
digester system for a wastewater treatment plant after the critical date), revg
713 F. Supp. 372, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (D. Utah 1989), reh'g denied, No.
89-1596 (Fed. Cir. July 2,1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file), rehg de-
nied, No. 89-1596 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp
file) (en bane).
9. The proposition is that inventors, whether individuals or large busi-
nesses, must recoup the up-front "sunk costs" of research and development by
securing future sales of the results of the research and development. The po-
tentially enormous and growing costs of technology development is illustrated
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ever, are the Federal Circuit's policy-based, on-sale bar inquiry
and the factual complexity of cases involving executory sales
offers. The Federal Circuit's policy-based analysis involves bal-
ancing the needs of the public (avoiding detrimental public reli-
ance upon the free availability of the invention, encouraging
early invention disclosures, and preventing pre-application ex-
ploitation of the invention) against the needs of the inventor
(giving the inventor time to determine whether a patent is a
worthwhile investment). 0 Because the Federal Circuit focuses
on these policies, some commentators argue that the applica-
tion of the on-sale bar provision lacks predictability, fails to in-
form the inventor how to behave, fails to inform the lower
courts of the basis for invoking the bar to patentability, and,
thus, fosters litigation."
in two examples. First, respecting electronic circuit technology, Richard Fos-
ter, director of McKinsey & Company, a management consulting firm, argues:
The rate of effort (dollars per year) has been increasing even more
quickly than chip density. This means it is getting more and more ex-
pensive to develop each new generation of electronic memories. It
took about $100 million to develop the future workhorse of the per-
sonal computer - the 256K RAM. What will it take to develop the
next generation RAM - the million bit (or megabit) RAM? Probably
a good deal more than $100 million.
R. FosTER, INNOVATION: THE ATTACKER'S ADVANTAGE 101 (1986). Second, the
average cost of developing one new pharmaceutical drug has been estimated to
run as high as $54 million. Hansen, The Pharmaceutical Development Process:
Estimates of Development Costs and Times and the Effects of Proposed Regula-
tory Changes, in IssuEs IN PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMIcS 151, 180 (R. Chien ed.
1979).
10. See infra Part I. C. (discussing the policies behind the on-sale bar).
11. For example, one commentator criticized the Federal Circuit's rejec-
tion of the bright-line "reduction to practice" on-sale bar rule. The commenta-
tor argued that with the bright-line rule
both courts and patent counsel will know that the grace period began
when the inventor reduced the... [invention] to practice. Since there
is a well-established body of law for determining when an invention
has been reduced to practice, the concerned parties will know with
certainty when the grace period began.
Note, UMC Electronics, supra note 3, at 161. In addition, Professor Choate has
argued that "[c]ourt decisions could better be based on ... concrete tests than
on mere speculation as to what was in the minds of sellers or purchasers when
an offer was made or an executory contract entered into." Choate, supra note
3, at 918.
The bright-line rule debate is certainly not unique to patent law jurispru-
dence. For example, criminal law scholars have debated the propriety of
bright-line rules. See, e.g., Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1468 (1985) (discussing the uncertainty present in fourth amend-
ment case law and debating the propriety of a rule of reason standard versus
bright-line rules in determining violations of a person's fourth amendment
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures).
1508 [Vol. 75:1505
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In 1990, the Federal Circuit decided Envirotech Corp. v.
Westech Engineering, Inc.,12 requiring, as a threshold to apply-
ing the on-sale bar, that the inventor objectively manifest his or
her intent to exploit the invention in a definite offer to sell
before the critical date.13 Although this "objective manifesta-
tion of intent" requirement may provide more predictability to
the on-sale bar issue, application of the requirement in En-
virotech permitted the inventor's patent to escape the on-sale
bar, despite the patent owner's admission of intent to exploit
the invention through its executory sales offer.14 This result,
which clearly runs afoul of the policy prohibiting pre-applica-
tion exploitation, illustrates the impropriety of the court's re-
strictive bright-line rule.
This Comment urges the Federal Circuit's adherence to a
true, policy-based analytical framework for the on-sale bar is-
sue. Part I examines the on-sale bar provision, 15 its policy un-
derpinnings,16 and the debate over a policy-based, as opposed to
a rule-based or even a hybrid, analytical framework for the ex-
ecutory sales offer situation, including an overview of pre-En-
virotech case law.17 Part H describes the Envirotech decision.
Part I critiques Envirotech's analysis of the facts in light of
the policies behind the bar and the creation of a bright-line
rule. Part III also illustrates that application of a true, policy-
based, on-sale bar analytical framework would have yielded a
different result in Envirotech. This Comment concludes that
the Federal Circuit's use of restrictive bright-line, on-sale bar
rules, especially in an executory sales offer scenario, may po-
12. 904 F.2d 1571,15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1990), revg 713 F.
Supp. 372, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (D. Utah 1989), reh'g denied, No. 89-1596
(Fed. Cir. July 2,1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file), rehg denied, No.
89-1596 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (en
banc).
13. Specifically, the Federal Circuit concluded that "the inventor's at-
tempted exploitation must be objectively manifested as a definite sale or offer
to sell the invention. The subjective, uncommunicated, and ultimate intention
of the offeror, however clear, is not alone sufficient." Id. at 1575, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1233.
14. The district court noted that Envirotech in deposition admitted that it
intended to provide the invention when performing its executory sales con-
tract. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 372, 374, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804, 1805 (D. Utah 1989), rev'd, 904 F.2d 1571, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1990); cf 904 F.2d at 1575, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1233 (discussing patent owner's admission of intent).
15. See infra Part I. B.
16. See inffra Part I. C.
17. See infra Part I. D.
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tentially result in future decisions unfaithful to the policies be-
hind the on-sale bar. This Comment, therefore, urges the
courts' adherence to a true, policy-based, on-sale bar analytical
framework, especially in executory sales offer situations.
I. THE ON-SALE BAR TO PATENTABILITY
A. THE UNITED STATES PATENT LAW
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the
power to promote the progress of science by giving inventors
the exclusive right to their discoveries.' 8 The patent laws en-
acted under this constitutional provision grant an inventor the
right to exclude others from practicing the invention for a lim-
ited term, typically seventeen years.19 This grant is conditioned
on the invention meeting the requirements for patentability set
forth in the patent laws.20
Two competing theories support the existence of the patent
system: the "bargain" theory and the "natural rights" theory.
The bargain theory stresses the needs of society. Advocates of
this theory view the patent grant as a reward for disclosing the
science behind the invention to the public.21 The natural rights
theory, on the other hand, stresses the rights of the inventor.
Advocates of this theory argue that because the inventor has no
18. See supra note 1.
19. The regular duration of a United States patent for a process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or a plant is 17 years from the date of is-
sue. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The term of certain patents may be extended
in certain circumstances as authorized by the 1983 and 1984 amendments to
the patent laws. See i. § 155, as amended by Act of Jan. 4, 1983, Pub. L. No.
97-414, § 11(a), 96 Stat. 2065, § 155A, as amended by Act of Oct. 13, 1983, Pub.
L. No. 98-127, § 4(a), 97 Stat. 832, § 156, Act of Sept. 24, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, Title II, § 201(a), 98 Stat. 1598. The term of patents on ornamental designs
is 14 years. See id. § 173.
20. See supra pote 2.
21. This theory is at least partially supported by the text of the Constitu-
tion itself, which enumerates the elements of the potential bargain: promoting
the useful arts in exchange for the exclusive right to exploit the invention for
a definite length of time. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It also seems to be
supported by common sense and the theory underlying the free-enterprise sys-
tem. As one recent commentator notes:
In analyzing how patents promote scientific progress, the courts have
emphasized two mechanisms: first, the prospect of obtaining a patent
monopoly provides an incentive to invest in research to make new in-
ventions; and second, the patent system promotes disclosure of new
inventions and thereby enlarges the public storehouse of knowledge.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experi-
mental Use, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1017, 1024 (1989) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bi-
cron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974)).
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obligation to disclose the invention, the government must com-
pensate the inventor for disclosure of the inventionze The con-
troversies that erupt between pro- and anti-patent forces tend
to involve fundamental disagreements about the theories un-
derlying the patent system. s
B. THE ON-SALE BAR TO PATENTABLTY
One of the conditions for patentability requires the inven-
tor to refrain from placing the invention "on sale in this coun-
try, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States."2' This provision, section 102(b) of
22. This theory, too, is supported at least in part by the Constitution, be-
cause it mentions the "rights" of inventors. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
As Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts asserted in an 1852 speech prais-
ing the patent system:
The Constitution does not attempt to give an inventor a right to
his invention.... No such thing. But the Constitution recognizes an
original, pre-existing, inherent right of property in the invention, and
authorizes Congress to secure to inventors the enjoyment of that
right. But the right existed before the Constitution and above the
Constitution, and is, as a natural right, more clear than that which a
man can assert in almost any other kind of property.
E.B. LiPSCOMB, 1 WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:9, at 58-59 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
WALKER ON PATENTS]. -
A recent commentator, Professor Eisenberg, however, argues that "[t]he
framers of the United States Constitution rejected the notion that inventors
have a natural property right in their inventions." Eisenberg, supra note 21, at
1024 n.27. In support, she quotes Thomas Jefferson, who wrote:
"Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society
may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an en-
couragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utilities, but
this may or may not be done according to the will and convenience of
society, without claim or complaint from anybody."
23. Both of these theories, however, are partially incomplete. The bargain
theory denies any absolute right of the inventor to her productivity. She must
accept the government bargain or have no protection at all. See supm note 2.
The natural rights theory is inconsistent with the idea of a limited-term patent
grant, see supra note 19, because, if the inventor has complete rights to the in-
vention, it is not clear how the government can declare the invention public
property after the patent expires. Nevertheless, the ideological underpinnings
of the two theories shed light on the debate over the proper balance between
the interests of society and those of the inventor.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). In 1836, Congress enacted the first on-sale
bar provision in the patent laws. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat.
117, 119 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988)). Congress, in enacting
this provision, wanted to halt the fraudulent practice of patenting inventions
that had long been in public use. See S. REP. No. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1836). This provision, however, allowed no grace period following the sale ac-
tivity. Three years later in 1839, Congress added a grace priod of two years to
the on-sale bar provision. See Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354
1991] 1511
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title 35 of the United States Code, is known as the on-sale bar
to patentability.25 The on-sale bar is procedural in nature;26 it
limits the period of time in which an inventor may file a patent
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice (PTO). Specifically, it provides that an inventor must ap-
ply for a patent within one year of placing the invention on sale
in the United States or lose the patent privilege.27
The on-sale bar operates to preclude patentability either
during the patent application process or during litigation after
issuance of the patent. To help enforce the bar during the ap-
plication process, a patent applicant owes the PTO a duty of
candor to disclose any sale activity that could preclude a patent
grant.28 To help enforce the bar after issuance of the patent,
(current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988)). This grace period apparently
grew out of the recognition in the 1836 Senate Report that an inventor usually
needs some time to perfect the invention before being confident enough to ap-
ply for a patent. See S. REP. No. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1836). In 1939,
the statutory grace period was reduced to one year. See Act of August 5, 1939,
ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212, 1212 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988)).
The legislative history behind the 1939 amendment indicates a Congressional
attempt to balance the interests of the public with those of the inventor. See
S. REP. No. 876, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1939) (stating that "two years ap-
pears unduly long and operates as a handicap to industry" and that "[o]ne year
is believed to be a very fair period to all concerned"); H.R. REP. No. 961, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1939) (same).
25. See supra note 3 (listing extensive commentary on the on-sale bar
issue).
26. See, e.g., Note, UMC Electronics, supra note 3, at 153 (noting that "the
on sale bar is in the nature of a statute of limitations").
27. The patent laws of most other countries, including Japan and all
members of the European Economic Community, do not allow any grace pe-
riod after sale activity. See J.W. BAXTER, 2 WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRAC-
TICE §§ 4-2 to 4-3, 4-25 to 4-26 (1990). The countries that allow a grace period
after sale activity are Haiti (one year), the Philippines (one year), S.W. Africa
(two years, but only sales outside S.W. Africa), and the United States (one
year). See it. §§ 4-25 to 4-26.
28. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.560(b) (1990). Because the patent process is ex parte
and because that process inures to the benefit of the applicant, this duty of
candor is meant to balance the unfairness that otherwise would occur if the
applicant were to have the benefits of an ex parte process without any corre-
sponding duty. See, e.g., Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 793-94, 167 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 532, 544 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("The ex parte prosecution and examination of
a patent application must not be considered as an adversary proceeding and
should not be limited to the standards required in inter partes proceedings.").
A breach of the duty of candor can result in the PTO not issuing a patent, or a
court rendering an issued patent unenforceable. See generally 4 WALKER ON
PATENTS, supra note 22, § 12:4, at 16-22 (discussing the duty of candor, the
standard courts use to find a breach of that duty, and the results of a breach).
In addition, if the duty of candor is breached to the extent of an actual fraud,
attorney fees may be awarded against the defaulting party in a later lawsuit.
1512 Vol. 75:1505
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the patent laws allow persons sued for patent infringement to
defend against the suit by using the on-sale bar to invalidate
the patent.29
The Federal Circuit has established a general framework
for addressing the on-sale bar issue during litigation. A chal-
lenger to the patent's validity must prove, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence,30 that the patent holder made a definite sale or
offer to sell the invention before the critical date.31 The chal-
lenger must show additionally that the subject matter of the
sale activity corresponds to the subject matter of the patent.32
If the challenger fulfills these burdens, he or she has estab-
lished a prima facie case for applying the on-sale bar to invali-
date the patent.33 The patent owner, however, has several
defenses to the prima facie case. For example, the patent
See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1988) (such fees may be awarded in "exceptional cases");
Pickering v. Holman, 459 F.2d 403, 408, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 583, 586 (9th Cir.
1972) (same). Also, the fraud on the PTO may give rise to an antitrust viola-
tion. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 174, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 404, 406 (1965).
29. The patent laws provide that a "patentee shall have remedy by civil
action for infringement of his patent." 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988). The patent laws
also provide the alleged infringer with a defense upon showing "[i]nvalidity of
the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part H [including the
on-sale bar requirement] of this title as a condition for patentability." Id.
§ 282(2). Finally, a party who wishes to use a patent, believing it to be invalid,
also can seek a federal court declaration that the patent is invalid. See 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (1988). If the party seeking the declaration demonstrates that a
real controversy about the patent exists, the court will allow the suit. See
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
30. Courts defer to the PTO's judgment and presume a patent to be valid;
thus, the patent laws require clear and convincing evidence for a court to in-
validate a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
31. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1465, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
32. Id. The standard for finding that the subject matter of the sale activ-
ity corresponds to the subject matter of the patent is analogous to an "obvi-
ousness" analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Section 103 requires, as a
condition to patentability, that "[a] patent may not be obtained... if the dif-
ferences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Thus, if that
which was placed on sale renders that which is sought to be patented obvious
to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art, the "subject matter" re-
quirement of the Federal Circuit's on-sale bar inquiry is satisfied. The Federal
Circuit refers to this analysis as the "102(b)/103 analysis." See UMCEZecs., 816
F.2d at 650-51 n.4, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467 n.4; Note, UMC Eectronics,
supra note 3, at 146-52 (discussing and criticizing the Federal Circuit's
102(b)/103 analysis).
33. See UMCElecs., 816 F.2d at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
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owner may negate application of the bar on the ground that, at
the time of the sale activity, the invention was not sufficiently
perfected to be placed on sale,34 or that the sale was made for
the purpose of experimental testing.35 The court conducts all
of these factual inquiries within a framework that accommo-
dates the policies behind the on-sale bar.s6
C. PoLIcIES BEHIND THE ON-SALE BAR
The Federal Circuit has articulated repeatedly four policies
behind the on-sale bar: the policy against allowing the inventor
to exploit the invention commercially for a term substantially
greater than the -statutorily authorized period; the policy
against removing from the public any inventions that it has jus-
tifiably come to believe are freely available; the policy favoring
prompt, widespread public disclosure of new inventions; and
the policy allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time
following sales activity to determine whether a patent is a
worthwhile investment
7
34. Id. at 657, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472. An "invention" is generally
considered that which is not obvious in light of existing techniques and tech-
nology. See supra note 32 (discussing the non-obviousness condition to patent-
ability). Therefore, if -the inventiveness (i.e., that which made the thing
nonobvious) occurred after the sale activity, the patent owner may escape the
on-sale bar if she had not yet, at the time of the offer, invented, and thus did
not intend to offer, that which was patented.
35. The on-sale bar is avoided if the primary purpose of the sale was ex-
perimental. See United States Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 716,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898, 1901 (Fed Cir. 1990); Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo
Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir.
1987); UMC Eecs., 816 F.2d at 657, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472. The purpose,
whether for experimental or for commercial purposes, of an alleged sale is
measured by the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., United States EnvtL
Prods., 911 F.2d at 716-18, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1901-02. These circum-
stances include the necessity for third-party testing, the amount of control re-
tained by the inventor over the buyer's use, the length of the test period,
whether any payment was made for the invention, whether there was any se-
crecy obligation on the part of the buyer, whether progress records were kept,
whether persons other than the inventor conducted the asserted experiments,
and the length of the test period in relation to test periods of similar devices.
See Rooklidge, supra note 3, at 557.
36. See UMC Elecs., 816 F.2d at 652, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
37. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing King Instrument Corp. v.
Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (cit-
ing In re Caveny, 761 F.2d 671, 676, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1985)),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), rev V 713 F. Supp. 372, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1804 (D. Utah 1989), rehg denied, No. 89-1596 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, USApp file), reh'g denied, No. 89-1596 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (en banc).
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1. The Policy Against Pre-Application Exploitation
The patent laws grant the inventor the right to exclude
others from practicing the invention for a limited term.3s This
"right to exclude others" effectively permits the patent owner
to practice the invention free from competition.39 The monopo-
listic nature of the patent grant is at odds with the idea of a
market economy which is dedicated to the principle that a com-
petitive marketplace is in the public's best interest.40 The pol-
icy and economic theory behind the antitrust laws warrant a
strict adherence to the term of the patent grant. When an in-
ventor exploits4 ' the invention before the critical date, she ef-
fectively extends the patent grant beyond the term that
Congress intended.4 Accordingly, courts interpret the on-sale
38. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988). Contrary to popular belief, the patent laws do
not grant the inventor the affirmative right to practice her patented invention.
Practicing one's patented invention may infringe another's patent rights, as is
the case with a patented invention that is an improvement of a more basic in-
vention. And if that basic invention is also protected by a patent, the owner of
the improvement patent, in order to practice her patented invention, may need
to obtain a license from the basic patent owner. See generally Cheung, Prop-
erty Rights and Invention, 8 REs. L. & EcON. 5, 12-14 (1986) (discussing the
economic issues of "blocking" patents).
39. Of course, not all patents confer great economic wealth on the patent
owner. The economic reward that the patent grant confers on the owner de-
pends primarily- on the breadth of the patent grant (i.e., whether the patent
covers a pioneering invention) and the existence of non-infringing substitutes.
See generally F. SHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARET STRucruRE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 442-43 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing the factors affecting the patent
owner's profits derived from the patented invention).
40. See H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1-24
(1985). Commentators disagree, however, as to what degree of economic con-
centration is in the best interest of the consumer and whether consumer inter-
ests are paramount. Compare R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX: A POLICY
AT WAR WrrH ITSELF 163-401 (1978) (illustrating how the antitrust laws recur-
ring hostility to big business, far from protecting the consumer against monop-
olistic depredations, has encouraged a special and costly form of protection for
inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses) with Schwartz, "Justice" and
Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1076, 1078 (1979)
(arguing that "[t]he dogma that 'antitrust laws protect competition not com-
petitors' overstates the case and ignores considerations of justice"). Neverthe-
less, the general policy against trade restraints collides with the patent laws.
See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
893, 899 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that "[w]hen, however, the patented product is
so successful that it evolves into its own economic market... or succeeds in
engulfing a large section of a preexisting market, the patent and antitrust laws
necessarily clash"), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1016, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 96 (1982),
reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 985 (1982).
41. 'Exploit" means commercial exploitation, not experimentation. See
i fra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
42. In King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 226 U.S.P.Q.
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bar to prevent exploitation that extends the term of the patent
grant.43
2. The Policy to Avoid Detrimental Public Reliance
Sale activity involving an invention may result in a disclo-
sure" that, in the absence of a valid patent or pending patent
application, may cause the public to practice the invention in
the reasonable belief that the invention is freely available.4
Subsequently taking this invention from the public by granting
(BNA) 402 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), the Federal Cir-
cuit characterized the policies against pre-application commercial exploitation
as including "prohibiting an extension of the period for exploiting the inven-
tion." IMi at 860, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406. As one commentator put it: "he
policy against pre-application commercial exploitation is, simply stated, to 'pre-
vent the commercial exploitation of an invention as a trade secret for more
than one year' before filing a patent application." Rooklidge & von Hoffmann,
supra note 3, at 40 (footnote omitted). Another commentator states that "[t]he
policy was the need to prevent an inventor from holding back the secret of his
invention while at the same time exploiting them and thereafter applying for
a limited monopoly when faced with competition, thus delaying the time when
the invention becomes freely available to the public." Zieg, supra note 3, at
470. Thus, the policy is triggered whether or not there is a disclosure by
means of a sale to the public. See id, at 471; Note, New Guidelines, supra note
3, at 734.
Additionally, courts have long held that the determination of whether the
inventor engaged in permissible or impermissible exploitation depends on
whether the inventor made a "definite offer" for sale. UMC Elecs. Co. v.
United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1472 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988). Because, however, commercial activity
can raise the on-sale bar even if it is not an offer to sell in the contract sense,
see RCA v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449,
1454 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Rooklidge, supra note 3, at 552; Rooklidge & von Hoff-
mann, supra note 3, at 40-41, the "definite offer" requirement seems to be
nothing more than a requirement that the commercial activity must actually
implicate the policy against pre-application exploitation.
43. The Federal Circuit also has stated that the policy against pre-applica-
tion exploitation is a central policy concern of the on-sale bar. See King In-
strument, 767 F.2d at 860, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406.
44. As one commentator notes:
[I]tems are commonly sold with an instruction manual or a list of con-
tents disclosing the detailed workings or constituent parts, often at
the express demand of a prospective customer. Thus, actual or at-
tempted sales of an invention may cause the public to reasonably rely
on the belief that the information disclosed is in the public domain.
Note, New Guidelines, supra note 3, at 733. The concern will perhaps be
greater in the executory sales situation. Not having a delivered product, the
purchaser will be all the more likely to demand information regarding the de-
tailed workings of the offered product.
45. See S. REP. No. 876, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939) (indicating a concern
that "the public may . . . come to believe that the invention is open to any-
one"); H.R. REP. No. 961, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939) (same).
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a patent to the inventor may be unfair to a person who has re-
lied on the invention's free availability and, as a result, has in-
vested capital in development, manufacturing, or marketing to
exploit the invention.48 Thus, Congress intended, and courts
have interpreted, the on-sale bar to avoid the unfairness of det-
rimental public reliance.47
3. The Policy Encouraging Early Invention Disclosures
The publication of patents promotes the progress of science
by adding to the pool of technical knowledge. Such additions
46. This unfairness is analogous to the theory of "detrimental reliance" in
contract law. For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwith-
standing the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be
limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1979).
Early cases involved proof of actual reliance by the public on pre-applica-
tion disclosures. See, eg., Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881) (noting
that "the invention had found its way into general, and almost universal, use"
where "[t]he inventor slept on his rights for eleven years"); Consolidated
Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1876) (observing that "[liarge
amounts of money must... have been invested in the business of making and
selling... [these] jars by various persons" where the inventor delayed filing
his patent application for eight years while the invention, a canning jar, be-
came widely used). But, as one commentator notes: "The policy, however, ap-
plies to pre-application disclosures, regardless of the existence of actual
reliance. It is the mere possibility of detrimental reliance that must be
avoided." Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 36 (emphasis in origi-
nal). An inventor, however, may prevent any detrimental reliance by stating
upon disclosure that the invention is not freely available and by obtaining a
confidentiality agreement. See i. at 37. As the Federal Circuit stated, a pre-
application disclosure will implicate the policy unless the inventor had "'a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy and confidentiality."' Moleculon Research
Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261,1265,229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 805, 808 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (quoting district court opinion, 594 F. Supp. 1420, 1427 (D. Del. 1984)),
cert denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
47. See supra note 24 (citing the on-sale bar provision's legislative his-
tory); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1592 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (policies underlying on-sale bar
include "'discouraging the removal of inventions from the public domain
which the public justifiably comes to believe are freely available"' (quoting
King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226 U.S.P.Q. 402, 406
(Fed. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986))). Because, however, the in-
ventor is able to prevent the belief that the invention is freely available in the
sale context, the policy to avoid detrimental public reliance is not implicated in
the typical on-sale bar case. See Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 3, at
37.
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inure to the public's benefit and spur further inventiveness."
The sooner an inventor discloses an invention in a patent appli-
cation, the sooner the public will learn of the new technology
behind the invention.49 The public, however, only benefits
from accurate public disclosures.50 If inventors are rushed, the
number of defective patent applications will increase accord-
ingly. This in turn increases needlessly the workload of the
PTO. It also increases the number of defective disclosures in is-
sued patents which may mislead future scientific research that
relies on the accuracy of the patent disclosure and may burden
the courts with more challenges to patent validity.5' Thus,
courts interpret the on-sale bar to encourage inventors to give
to the public, as early as practicable, technically accurate infor-
mation regarding useful inventions. 52
4. The Policy Giving the Inventor Time Before Filing
There are costs involved in obtaining a patent - most sig-
nificantly, the inventor's time, attorney fees, and filing fees.53
An inventor faces a difficult determination as to whether a pat-
48. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1022; Rooklidge & von Hoffmann,
supra note 3, at 38; Note, New Guidelines, supra note 3, at 733; Note, UMC
Electronics, supra note 3, at 137 n.45.
49. The public only receives the inventor's specification of her invention if
and when a patent issues. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). On the average, the pat-
enting process take 19.9 months from filing to issuance of the patent. PTO
Commissioner Donald J. Quigg's Address to the ABA Conference, 38 PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 465, 466 (1989).
50. See Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 39 (noting that "this
policy should only be triggered when the inventor can satisfy the enabling dis-
closure requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112"). An "enabling disclosure" is that
which is sufficient to enable a skilled person to make and use the invention.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
51. See UIMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 664-65, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1465, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ef-
fect of eliminating the on-sale bar reduction to practice requirement is that the
"technology community... will file more 'paper patents' . .. merely add[ing]
to the clutter of unproved patents in the PTO and in the courts, requiring fees,
examinations, lawyers, trials and appeals, all of which disserve both the in-
venting and the using communities"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
52. See RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061-62, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1453-54 (Fed. Cir. 1989), affg 701 F. Supp. 456, 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (D. Del. 1988).
53. See Roberts, Patent Office will be User-Financed, L.A. Daily J., Oct.
18, 1990, at 7, col. 5. Patent attorneys typically charge between six to ten thou-
sand dollars to file a patent with the PTO. This includes attorney and filing
fees. Should the PTO initially reject the patent, which frequently happens,
the patent owner may incur additional attorney fees to amend and refile the
patent application. Also, the inventor may incur additional costs in an inter-
ference action which occurs if other patent applications from other inventions
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ent will confer sufficient economic returns to justify the costs
of the patenting process. 4 Additionally, the inventor's attorney
may need to determine whether the invention involves subject
matter that is patentable, and if so, the attorney must draft the
patent application.-5 These considerations led Congress to pro-
vide the inventor with a grace period. Currently, that grace
period is statutorily set at one year from the time of the sale
activity.57
In addition, the invention may require further testing to
determine whether it will be useful.e8 Thus, courts recognize
that sale activity for purposes of determining the usefulness of
the invention, namely "experimentation," does not trigger the
running of the grace period.59 Courts, however, do not consider
experimentation to include market testing or attempts to de-
velop buyer demand for the invention.6° Such a purpose falls
contain the same or a similar invention. Interview with Grady Frenchick, Pat-
ent Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (Apr. 4, 1991).
54. See S. REP. No. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1836) (noting that an in-
ventor usually needs some time to perfect the invention before being confident
enough to apply for a patent). In addition, patenting may not be the most ef-
fective way to protect the inventor's rights; trade secret or copyright protec-
tion may be the appropriate avenue. See generally 2 WALKER ON PATENTS,
supra note 22, § 8:2 (discussing the option of protecting the rights of an inven-
tion through the law of trade secrets).
55. See Note, New Guidelines, supra note 3, at 735 (discussing the time
and effort required in preparing a patent application); Choate, supra note 3, at
907 (noting that "many of the swift moving months of that all too short 'year'
may be consumed in the attorney's office in the preparation of drawings and in
the draft and redraft of an application").
56. The grace period is, in a sense, a statute of limitations which begins to
run when the impermissible sale activity occurs. See supra note 26. If the in-
ventor fails to file a patent application before the one-year grace period ex-
pires, the inventor loses the patent right. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
57. See supra note 24 (tracing the evolution of the statutory grace period
from no grace period established in the first on-sale bar provision in 1836, to a
two-year grace period established in 1839, and finally to the current one-year
grace period established in 1939).
58. Inventions are required to be "useful" to be patentable. 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988). To comply with this requirement, the invention need not be su-
perior to existing products and processes; it only needs to be operable and ca-
pable of use to achieve some human purpose that is not illegal, immoral, or
contrary to public policy. See I CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 5, § 4.01.
59. See supra note 35 (discussing the experimental use doctrine, which ne-
gates what the courts would otherwise consider on-sale barred sale activity).
Once the invention is reduced to practice, the experimental use justification is
not available to the inventor as a matter of law. See Rooklidge & von Hoff-
mann, supra note 3, at 49 (arguing that if the inventor's activity was not for
the purpose of reducing her invention to practice, the experimental use justifi-
cation does not apply and the on-sale bar then does apply).
60. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 983 (Fed.
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into the category of commercial exploitation rather than
experimentation.
5. The Policy Balance
Commentators seem to agree that if the inventor's sale ac-
tivity implicates any of the policies that favor the public, the
on-sale bar will attach unless countered by one of the policies
that favor the inventor.61 Courts, however, never apply the on-
sale bar when the inventor's activity does not implicate the pol-
icy against pre-application exploitation. 2 Thus, it seems that a
more accurate statement of the policy balance is that in order
to trigger the running of the on-sale bar grace period, the in-
ventor's activity must implicate the policy against pre-applica-
tion exploitation. The implication of any additional policies
favoring the public further justifies invoking the on-sale bar.
An inventor's activity that implicates either the policy avoiding
detrimental public reliance or the policy encouraging early in-
vention disclosures may warrant application of the public use
bar,63 but each does not, by themselves, warrant the application
of the on-sale bar.64
D. BRiGHT-LInE RULES VERSUS A POLICY-BASED ANALYSIS iN
ON-SALE BAR JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING EXECUTORY
SALES OFFERS
The course of on-sale bar jurisprudence illustrates the de-
bate over whether to use a policy-based framework or a rule-
Cir. 1983) (citing cases). See generally Note, The Validity of Patents after
Market Testing: A New and Improved Experimental Use Doctrine?, 85 CoLUM.
L. REV. 371 (1985) (discussing market testing and how it should be treated
under the experimental use doctrine).
61. See Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 44; Note, New Guide-
lines, supra note 3, at 736.
62. This can be explained by the fact that "[ain on-sale bar situation will
always involve commercial activities and, thus, will always implicate this pol-
icy against pre-application commercialization." Rooklidge & von Hoffmann,
supra note 3, at 45.
63. The public use bar, like the on-sale bar, is codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988). See Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 45 (noting
the dichotomies between the on-sale bar and the public use bar).
64. Further supporting the notion that an implication of the policy against
pre-application exploitation is required as a threshold to the application of the
on-sale bar is the fact that courts have always required as a threshold to apply-
ing the on-sale bar that there be a "definite offer." See supra note 42. If there
is no "definite offer," the courts find that the activity does not implicate the
policy against pre-application exploitation, and hence does not trigger the run-
ning of the on-sale bar grace period. Id.
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based framework to determine whether to apply the on-sale
bar to situations involving an inventor who makes an offer to
enter into an executory sales contract that provides for delivery
after the critical date. The policies of avoiding detrimental pub-
lic reliance, encouraging early invention disclosures, and
preventing pre-application exploitation all favor application of
the on-sale bar to patentability. Conversely, the policy of giving
the inventor a grace period is the only policy that favors non-
application of the on-sale bar. Thus, a policy-based analysis
tends to favor society's interests at the expense of the inventor,
while bright-line rules tend to limit the importance assessed to
the policies and society's interests benefiting the inventor's
interests.65
1. The Executory Sales Offer
Courts have found it difficult to apply the on-sale bar to
executory sales offers; the problem is essentially one of proof.
66
With only an offer for sale, no "smoking gun" evidence exists
in the form of an article actually sold. Inventors can capitalize
on this proof problem by not disclosing their invention in a
written sales offer. An inventor may be able to describe an
older technology - or describe no technology at all - in the
written offer, yet still exploit the new invention through that
same offer. The inventor thereby exploits the invention be-
yond the one-year grace period, yet a court probably could not
find clear and convincing evidence of a definite offer to sell the
invention.
2. Pre-Federal Circuit Cases
Early courts established bright-line rules based on the na-
ture of the sales agreement, arguing that the form of the sales
agreement is most probative of whether an inventor has placed
the invention on sale.6 7 Later courts stressed the importance of
65. See Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that the Federal Circuit re-
jected a pro-patentee approach to the on-sale bar provision by rejecting in
UMC Electronics Co. v. United States a bright-line reduction to practice rule
for application of the bar).
66. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
67. An early doctrine of executory sales contracts was laid down in the
seminal case of McCreery Eng'g Co. v. Massachusetts Fan Co., 195 F. 498 (1st
Cir. 1912). In this case, the court broadly held that an executory contract, en-
tered into before the critical date, that provided for the manufacture and de-
livery of an apparatus after the critical date, was not an on-sale bar. Id, at 501.
Specifically, the court stated.
The distinction between an executory contract to construct and to
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the inventor's intent to exploit the invention and rejected
bright-line rules based on the form of the sales agreement.rs
Thus, the courts' on-sale bar analytical framework tended gen-
erally, over time, toward a policy-based framework. Courts did
not, however, reach consensus as to the weight that they should
give to each of the policies.69
3. Pre-Envirotech Federal Circuit Cases
The Federal Circuit's approach to the on-sale bar issue re-
quires courts to consider the totality of the circumstances on a
pass title in the future and putting an article 'on sale' is substantial
and is not merely one of the 'witty diversities' of the law of sales. Es-
pecially is that distinction important when such an executory contract
is for the manufacture or construction which constitutes the first re-
duction to practice.
Id.; accord Sturtevant Co. v. Massachusetts Hair & Felt Co., 124 F.2d 95, 97, 51
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 420, 422 (1st Cir. 1941), cert denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Kie-
rulff v. Metropolitan Stevedore Co., 221 F. Supp. 830, 834, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
418, 421 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Redman v. Stedman Mfg. Co., 154 F. Supp. 378, 383,
115 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 281, 285 (M.D.N.C. 1957); Hemphill Co. v. Jordon, 86 F.
Supp. 248, 251, 83 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 431, 434 (M.D.N.C. 1949).
This strict rule against application of the on-sale bar applied to all execu-
tory sales contract situations. One commentator, however, stated that the gen-
eral rule at this time was that, regardless of the intent to exploit, "a contract
to construct from plans and deliver in the future is not an 'on sale' bar when
entered into prior to the critical date in a situation where the device or appara-
tus has never been completed prior to the critical date." Choate, supra note 3,
at 913.
68. For instance, the Sixth Circuit in Huszar v. Cincinnati Chem. Works,
172 F.2d 6, 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466 (6th Cir. 1949), relied on the policy against
pre-application exploitation to invoke the on-sale bar in an executory contract
situation. I& at 10, 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467. The Sixth Circuit specifically
stated:
Mhe inventors' right to a patent is conditioned upon refraining from
exploiting his discovery competitively after the invention is ready for
patenting, that while the statute allows him a limited period.., to
give him time to prepare an application, if he goes beyond that period
of probation he forfeits his right regardless of how little the public
may have learned about the invention.
I In addition, the district court in Triplett v. Line Material Co., 53 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 93 (N.D. Ill. 1942), czff'd, 133 F.2d 533, 56 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 398 (7th Cir.
1943), stated:
The fact that Congress in 1939, reduced the period of two years'
permissible public use or sale prior to an application to one year,
seems to the court to indicate a public policy to the effect that a public
use or sale, which is in fact a public use or sale, shall not be allowed
to be whittled away by refinements in argument.
Id. at 94.
69. The lack of consensus and continuity in patent law in general was the
primary reason for the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit in 1982. See supra note 7.
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case-by-case basis in comport with the policies behind the on-
sale bar.70 This approach is necessary because the policies de-
fine the on-sale bar rule.71 In developing the totality of the cir-
cumstances approach, the Federal Circuit has expressed
disfavor toward bright-line rules. 72 In so doing, the Federal
70. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1591 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
71. Id (quoting Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571,
1574,15 U.S.P.Q.21 (BNA) 1230, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1990), rev' 713 F. Supp. 372, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (D. Utah 1989), rehg denied, No. 89-1596 (Fed. Cir.
July 2, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file), reh'g denied, No. 89-1596
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (en banc).
72. For example, early decisions required as a threshold to applying the
on-sale bar that the invention had reached a particular stage of development,
known as "reduction to practice," at the time of the offer to sell. See 2 CHIsuM
ON PATENTS, supra note 5, § 6.020 [6][a] ("an early line of cases established a
rule (known as the 'on hand' doctrine) that neither an offer nor an actual con-
tract was a sufficient placing on sale unless a completed and working model of
the invention existed prior to the critical date"). The term "reduction to prac-
tice" is a borrowed term that is also used when determining who was the first
to invent among competing inventors. It is defined as that point in time when
the invention is completed or built and shown to work. See UMC Elecs. Co. v.
United States, 816 F.2d 647,652,2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465,1468 (Fe& Cir. 1987)
(stating that "[u]nder our precedent there cannot be a reduction to practice of
the invention ... without a physical embodiment which includes all limitations
of the claims"), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988); Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d
1326, 1328, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753, 755 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (" '[w]ithout an actual
reduction to practice there is no invention in existence which can be aban-
doned"' (quoting Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 651, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 117,
120 (C.C.P.A. 1976))). In 1987, the Federal Circuit engaged in an extensive pol-
icy analysis to conclude that "reduction to practice" is not absolutely required
to invoke the on-sale bar. UMC Elec., 816 F.2d at 655-56, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1470-71.
Further, early patent jurisprudence required courts to find "exact iden-
tity" between the offered product and the patented invention before applying
the on-sale bar. See, ag., Delong v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 1135, 1141,
206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[i]n order to sustain a finding of
invalidity under the 'on sale' bar.., it must be shown that the alleged invali-
dating sale was of a device substantially identical to that claimed under the
terms of the patent"); see also 2 CEISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 5, § 6.020 [3]
n.2 (citing numerous cases that seem to focus on the identity of patented and
on-sale items). 'xact identity" as a term of art essentially meant a strict re-
quirement that the product offered for sale had to be exactly the same as that
to which the patent owner has exclusive rights in her patent. As a practical
matter, if any element of the patented invention did not exist in the product
offered for sale, the court could not find "exact identity" and no on-sale bar.
Courts have long felt that this strict requirement stifled the furtherance of the
first three policies undergirding the on-sale bar. The Federal Circuit therefore
does not require "exact identity," it requires only that the offered invention
would have made the patented invention obvious to one skilled in the art. "A
patent may not be obtained... if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a per-
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Circuit argued that rigid rules are inappropriate because on-
sale bar analysis must turn ultimately on the policies behind
the bar.73
Before Envirotech, the Federal Circuit addressed whether
to apply the on-sale bar in several cases in which the inventor
made an offer before the critical date to enter into an executory
sales contract providing for delivery after the critical date. Two
cases, described below, illustrate how the Federal Circuit has
applied its policy-based analytical framework to the factual con-
text of an executory sales offer.
In the 1985 case of King Istrument Corp. v. Otar Corp.,4
the Federal Circuit addressed the on-sale bar as applied to an
inventor who made an ambiguous executory sales offer before
the critical date.75 The district court had found that the offer
son having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Under the modem view, a device offered for sale thus be-
comes part of the prior art. See, e.g., Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc.,
828 F.2d 1558, 1563, 1565, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1213, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
("[i]f a device was ... on sale before the critical date, then that device becomes
a reference under section 103 against the claimed invention" (citations omit-
ted); the court must determine "whether, for purposes of section 103/102(b),
the differences were material between the ... claimed invention and the de-
vice. . . on sale"); see also 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 5, § 6.02 [3] n.3
(citing cases that incorporate the on-sale device into a § 103 obviousness analy-
sis); supra notes 32, 34 (discussing the Federal Circuit's 102(b)/103 analysis).
73. The Federal Circuit, for instance, has quoted Chief Judge Wright's
comments in Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 131 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 413 (D. Del. 1961):
"The cases dealing with [section] 102(b) of the Patent Act are in a
state of confusion resulting from an attempt to establish hard and fast
rules of law based upon overly refined legal distinctions. The area
sought to be governed by these rules, however, encompasses an infi-
nite variety of factual situations which, when viewed in terms of the
policies underlying [section] 102(b), present an infinite variety of legal
problems wholly unsuited to mechanically-applied, technical rules."
UMCEecs., 816 F.2d at 654,2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470 (quoting Philco, 119 F.
Supp. at 815, 131 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 428-29).
74. 767 F.2d 853, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475
U.S. 1016 (1985).
75. The patent related to an automated apparatus for loading magnetic
(blank or pre-recorded audio or video) tape into closed cassettes. Id. at 855,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 403. The inventor filed a patent application on May 27,
1971. Id. at 859, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406. A machine was offered for sale in
a written price quote on May 22, 1970 - before the critical date of May 27,
1970. Id. at 859, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406. The parties disputed, however,
whether the inventor in the price quote had offered the new, not-yet-patented
machine or an older machine. Id. at 860-61, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 407. Never-
theless, the offer resulted in acceptance on June 8, 1970, and the customer re-
ceived delivery of two machines on June 17, 1970. Id. at 859, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 406. The parties also disputed whether the machines received were
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was for the new, not-yet-patented machine, as opposed to an
older machine, and therefore, the patent was invalid under the
on-sale bar.7 6 The patent owner argued that, because nothing
in the offer identified the subject matter of the invention, and
because no notice was given to the purchaser that a new or dif-
ferent machine existed, insufficient intent existed to find the
invention on sale.77 Emphasizing the policy against pre-applica-
tion exploitation,78 the Federal Circuit rejected the patent
owner's argument and held instead that a purchaser need not
have actual knowledge that the offer involved the invention in
order for the patent to be barred under'the on-sale bar.7 9 The
Federal Circuit then analyzed the totality of the circumstances
and affirmed the district court's finding that there was an offer
for sale, which triggered the application of the on-sale bar.8 0
the new, not-yet-patented machines or the older machines. Id. at 861, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 407.
76. Id at 859, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406.
77. To support its argument, the patent owner argued that the language
in the quote at issue was consistent with language used in quotes for the older
machine, the quote contained no reference as to how the machine worked, the
quote contained only general performance language that did not reveal which
type of machine was being offered, the customer was "surprised" when the
new machine was delivered, and the new machine had the same name as the
older machine. I& at 860-61, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 407.
78. Specifically, the court stated that "[t]he policies underlying the on sale
bar... concentrate on the attempt by the inventor to exploit his invention, not
whether the potential purchaser was cognizant of the invention." I& at 860,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 407.
79. Id- (citing In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 44 C.C.P-A. 846, 850, 113
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289, 292 (1957)).
The court's holding was limited, however, by the requirement that the
purchaser must know generally how the machine embodied in the offer will
perform. Id (citing In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1400, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 593,
598 (C.C.P.A. 1975)). The court stated that this was the case because the de-
scriptions contained in the inventor's price quotation generally informed the
purchaser how the machine would perform. Id.
80. In the court's analysis of the totality of the circumstances, it first
noted that the offer included a 40% allowance for the old machines. Id. at 861,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 407. The court reasoned that because the offer included
a discount if the purchaser returned the old machines, the offer must have
respected the sale of the newer, not-yet-patented machines. Id. The court also
found sufficient evidence to support a finding that the machine delivered by
King under the executory contract was the machine that actually embodied
the patented invention. I&. The Federal Circuit noted that the customer, in
his "unbiased live testimony," testified that he "was convinced that the two
machines received" were the new machines. Id The court went on to state




In the 1989 case of RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., the
Federal Circuit again addressed the on-sale bar as applied to an
ambiguous offer for sale made before the critical date.8 2 The
district court had found that the inventor had offered the in-
vention for sale before the critical date.83 The patent owner ar-
gued that the offer did not trigger the on-sale bar, because the
offer itself did not disclose the invention.84 The court rejected
this argument as legally incorrect.8a The court then held that
testimonial evidence was sufficient to prove that the offer for
sale did in fact offer the invention.8 6 The Federal Circuit in
RCA, as in King Instrument, then analyzed the totality of the
circumstances and affirmed the district court's finding that
there was an offer for sale that triggered the application of the
on-sale bar.87
81. 887 F.2d 1056, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cffg 701 F.
Supp. 456, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (D. Del. 1988).
82. The invention involved in this case related to a display system for
computer generating alphanumeric characters on a standard raster scan televi-
sion monitor. I& at 1058, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451. The inventor filed a
patent application on October 16, 1963. Id. In August, 1962, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration sent a request for proposals, along with engineering re-
quirements, for character generation equipment to 10 companies. Id. at 1059,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.. In response, RCA submitted to the FAA a pro-
posal to deliver its display system on October 8, 1962 - before the critical date
of October 16, 1962. Id.
83. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 701 F. Supp. 456, 478, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1305, 1323 (D. Del. 1988), qff'd, 887 F.2d 1056, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1449 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
84. 887 F.2d at 1060, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
85. Id. The court also noted that "merely offering to sell a product by
way of an advertisement or invoice may be evidence of a definite offer for sale
or a sale of a claimed invention even though no details are disclosed." Id. (em-
phasis in original).
86. Id. Stated more broadly, the court held: '"That the offered product is
in fact the claimed invention may be established by any relevant evidence,
such as memoranda, drawings, correspondence, and testimony of witnesses."
Id-
87. In its analysis of the totality of the circumstances, the Federal Circuit
noted the fact that the designer of the system named in the offer testified that
the offered system was the patented invention with additional components,
and that that testimony was "never disavowed." Id The court also noted that
"the bid documents themselves contain a technical description which is suffi-
cient to identify the [patented] invention, albeit not set forth in the language
of the claims in haec verba." Id. at 1060, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53.
RCA made other arguments (related to the offer) challenging the district
court's ruling. For instance, RCA also argued that, because the offer was for
experimental development there was no "definite offer." Id. at 1062, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. In rejecting this argument, the court first noted
that the "definite offer" requirement may be met by a patentee's commercial
activity that does not rise to the level of a formal offer under contract law
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II. ENVIROTECH: A SHIFT FROM POLICY TO A
BRIGHT-LINE RULE
In the 1990 case of Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Engineer-
in, Inc.,88 the Federal Circuit considered again the proper ap-
plication of the on-sale bar in the context of an offer to enter
into an executory sales contract. The case arose when En-
virotech, as owner of the patent rights for an improved compo-
nent used in a wastewater treatment system,89 sued Westech
for infringement.90 Westech defended by arguing that the court
should apply the on-sale bar to invalidate Envirotech's patent.9 '
Westech argued that Envirotech had submitted bids before the
critical date to all prime contractors to supply a certain compo-
nent part in a wastewater treatment plant construction pro-
ject.92 Although the bids disclosed an older design, rather than
principles. I& (citing General Elec. Co. v. United States, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
260, 276-77 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1979), and its analysis of pre-bid activities related
to a government contract). The court then reasoned that "a definite offer in
the contract sense clearly meets this requirement," that "an offer to conduct
experimental work may be as firm and definite, in the contract sense, as an
offer to sell a product," and that "a definite offer is not made indeftnite be-
cause it concerns experimental work." Id, Analyzing the facts, the court
noted that "RCA's bid was embodied in a lengthy written proposal providing
background information, a detailed delivery schedule, a rate of completion of
the proposed work and a separate section on financial data and costs." Id.
Thus, the court held that RCA had made a "definite offer." Id.
Also, RCA argued that because the FAA contract was for "services" to de-
sign and develop a prototype, no "thing" was offered for sale. Id. at 1062, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55. The court rejected this argument as well by ar-
guing that the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, and under
such an analysis, commercialization is not disproved because a certain label is
attached to the type of offer. Id. at 1063, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
88. 904 F.2d 1571,15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1990), revg 713 F.
Supp. 372, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (D. Utah 1989), rehg denied, No. 89-1596
(Fed. Cir. July 2, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file), reh!g denied, No.
89-1596 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (en
banc).
89. The patent covered an improved ballasted digester cover used in was-
tewater treatment plants. Id- at 1572, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. In es-
sence, the invention allowed for the construction of these immense concrete
covers using much less concrete, thereby significantly reducing the cost of
materials required to construct a cover. See U.S. Patent No. 4,391,705 (July 5,
1983) (Cook).
90. Envirotech, 904 F.2d at 1573, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
91. Id.
92. The City of Madison, Wisconsin, in 1980 invited bids on an addition to
a wastewater treatment plant. In response, sometime between May 5 and 8,
1980, Envirotech submitted proposals for a digester cover to all general con-
tractors bidding the mechanical portion of -the project. Envirotech's proposal
offered a "digester gas holder cover" to be constructed in accordance with the
plans and design specifications of the city's consulting engineer on the project,
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the improved one, Envirotech admitted that it intended to de-
liver its improved design when performing the contract.93 The
district court applied the on-sale bar to invalidate Envirotech's
patent.9 The Federal Circuit reversed.95
The Federal Circuit's decision began by stating the four
policies behind the on-sale bar.96 In analyzing two of the three
policies which favor society's interests, the court first concluded
that the facts of the case did not implicate the policy of avoid-
ing detrimental public reliance.9 In support, the court noted
that the prime contractors could not have reasonably believed
that Envirotech's improved design was freely available.98 The
court noted also that third-party disclosure99 of the invention
did not implicate the policy, because the third parties did not
detail the invention to the prime contractors. 1° °
Mr. Hill. At the May 8, 1980, bid opening, Hooper Construction Corp. was
awarded the prime contract, and Hooper accepted Envirotech's subcontract
proposal. Subsequently, on May 30, 1980, Envirotech disclosed a detailed de-
scription of its patented hydroballaster to Hill as part of a required pre-award
submittal. Envirotech applied for a patent on May 29, 1981. Id. at 1572-74, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
93. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 372, 374, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804, 1805 (D. Utah 1989) (noting that "Envirotech intended
to provide a hydroballast system [its invention] for the Madison project (Depo-
sition of Jon Coombs, at 36)"), rev'd, 904 F.2d 1571, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
94. The court based this holding on the three ancillary conclusions that
"[n]o later than May 8, 1980, Envirotech placed on sale its ballasting digester
cover, which embodies the entire invention set out in the Cook Patent, by bid-
ding and proposing to sell it to Hooper for $134,000;" that the invention had
been "sufficiently reduced to practice to be commercially marketable" by May
8, 1980; and that the May 8th bid was made "primarily for commercial rather
than for experimental purposes." Id. at 377, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807-08.
95. 904 F.2d at 1571, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
96. Id. at 1574, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
97. Id.
98. The court scrutinized the district court's finding that "'Envirotech
made its May 8th bid with the intent of exploiting the hydroballast invention
and with knowledge of how the invention would perform, whether or not the
engineers or Hooper had actual knowledge of it."' Id (quoting district court
opinion, 713 F. Supp. at 375, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806). The court con-
cluded that this finding "suggest[ed] that neither Hill nor Hooper was suffi-
ciently aware of the hydroballaster to justifiably believe that it was freely
available." Id.
99. Before making its bid, "Envirotech described its idea for the [inven-
tion] to CH2M-Hill, the engineers [working for the city on] the Madison pro-
ject." 713 F. Supp. at 373, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805. Also before making its
bid, "two Madison-area concrete contractors were shown sketches of the [in-
vention] for the purpose of providing price quotations" to Envirotech. 904 F.2d
at 1576, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
100. The court reasoned that "[e]ven if Hill [the city's engineer] had known
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Next, the court addressed the policy against pre-application
exploitation of the invention.10 1 As a threshold to applying the
on-sale bar, the court required that the attempted exploitation
be manifested objectively as a definite offer to sell the inven-
tion.102 The court found no objective manifestation of a definite
offer in Envirotech's bid, because the bid on its face referred to
an older design, and Envirotech was contractually obligated to
deliver that design.'0 3 Furthermore, the court distinguished be-
tween an inventor's intent of "ultimately exploiting" the inven-
tion and an intent of making a definite offer.104 Thus, the
Envirotech court concluded that, because Westech failed to
prove this "objective manifestation of intent to make a definite
offer" threshold requirement, Envirotech's actions did not give
rise to the on-sale bar.10 5
how the invention would perform, in the absence of any relationship of evi-
dence of communication between Hill and Hooper [the general contractor],
that fact would be insufficient to establish that Envirotech offered the inven-
tion to Hooper." 904 F.2d at 1574, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. The court's
reasoning was the same for the cement contractors' knowledge of the inven-
tion. I& at 1576, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
101. I& at 1574-77, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232-34.
102. I& at 1576, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
103. The court reasoned that the fact that the prime contractors did not
have actual knowledge of the invention tended to prove that Envirotech did
not objectively manifest an offer of the invention to the prime contractors. Id.
The court also discounted other evidence that tended to disprove there was an
offer of the invention. First, the court discounted the fact of Envirotech's dis-
closure, for the purpose of obtaining price quotes, of the invention to two ce-
ment contractors. The court reasoned that this fact did not implicate the
policy avoiding detrimental reliance because the cement contractors did not
communicate their knowledge to the prime contractors. I& Second, the court
discounted the fact of a letter from Envirotech's attorney to Envirotech, dated
just before Envirotech made its bid, that informed Envirotech that the "pend-
ing bid... would be an offer of sale of the [invention] and that a patent appli-
cation must be filed within a year of the bid," 713 F. Supp. at 374, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804, by reasoning that "nothing in the record suggests
that the attorney was familiar with the terms of Envirotech's ... offer," 904
F.2d at 1576, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
Westech had also argued that the contract documents furnish the older
design only as an example, not as a requirement. Id- at 1575-76, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1233. The court rejected this argument and stated that the "require-
ments contained in the documents are specific, not merely functional." Id. at
1575, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. For example, the court noted that "[t]he
'general conditions' section of the documents states that the drawings 'show
the location, character, dimensions, and details of the work to be performed,'
and [a] drawing ... clearly depicts the [older] design." Id. Further, the En-
virotech proposal referenced the alternative design three times. Id. at 1573,
1575-76, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231, 1233.
104. 904 F.2d at 1577, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
105. Id. at 1574, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 123. In, addition, the court distin-
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III. ENVIROTECI-S FLAWED POLICY ANALYSIS
Although the Federal Circuit did address the King Instru-
ment and RCA policy-based decisions,1 °6 the Envirotech opinion
reveals that the court misapplied that analytical framework. A
proper analysis of the totality of the circumstances should have
led the Federal Circuit to affirm the district court's application
of the on-sale bar.
The Envirotech court erred in its treatment of the policies
that favor society's interests. In particular, the court limited
the weight accorded to the policy against pre-application ex-
ploitation by creating a restrictive bright-line "objective mani-
festation of intent to make a definite offer" requirement and
disregarding Envirotech's admission of intent to exploit the in-
vention in its executory sales offer. The court also limited the
weight of the policy to avoid detrimental public reliance by lim-
iting the inquiry to only the reliance of the prospective pur-
chaser and by dismissing the fact that persons other than the
prospective purchaser had knowledge of the invention and the
sale offer. Finally, the court failed to address the policy favor-
ing early invention disclosures.
A. THE POLICY AGAINST PRE-APPLICATION EXPLOITATION
Although the Federal Circuit conceded that the policies be-
hind the on-sale bar center on the inventor's attempt to exploit
the invention,10 7 the court severely limited that policy by creat-
ing a bright-line rule that an inventor, in order to trigger the
application of the on-sale bar, must objectively manifest the at-
guished RCA on the basis that Envirotech's bid documents, unlike RCA's,
clearly specified a design other than the patented design. Id at 1576, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. The court also distinguished RCA in that En-
virotech, unlike RCA, attempted to keep the patented design confidential. Id-
The court cited King Instrument for the principle that "there is no re-
quirement that the purchaser have actual knowledge of the invention to in-
voke the on-sale bar," yet the court went on to state that "what the purchaser
reasonably believes the inventor to be offering is relevant to whether, on bal-
ance, the offer objectively may be said to be of the patented invention." Id-
(citing King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 402, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986)).
The court did not address the policy encouraging prompt, widespread pub-
lic disclosures of inventions as early as is practicable. Because Envirotech did
not offer its invention for sale, it did not need to address whether the inven-
tors had sufficiently developed the invention as of the critical date. Id. at 1577
n.*, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234 n.*.
106. See supra note 105.
107. 904 F.2d at 1575, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
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tempted exploitation of the invention in a definite offer to sell
the invention. 08 The court used the bright-line rule to allow
Envirotech to escape the on-sale bar, despite Envirotech's ad-
mission that its bid strategy was to disclose the older design in
the formal offer, but deliver the improved design when per-
forming the contract.109 In addition, the court stated that the
"subjective, uncommunicated, and ultimate intention of the of-
feror, however clear, is not alone sufficient" to trigger the on-
sale bar."0 The court's statement begs the question: what de-
gree of uncommunicated exploitation will the Federal Circuit
permit? The Federal Circuit analysis seems to give inventors
and their lawyers free reign to undermine the policies behind
the on-sale bar.
The danger of the court's restrictive bright-line rule is that
it provides the inventor with a greater opportunity to engage in
subversive bid strategies. As in Envirotech, such a bid strategy
involves the inventor manifesting an intent to exploit some-
thing other than the invention by purporting to offer that other
design in its formal offer. At the same time that the inventor
offers the other design in its formal offer, the inventor uses the
competitive advantage of the invention to obtain the executory
sales contract. Admittedly, this bid strategy involves a degree
of risk. As the Federal Circuit explains, Envirotech was obli-
gated contractually to supply the contractor with the quoted de-
sign."' The Federal Circuit did not, however, address whether
Envirotech's obligation was real or illusory. Stated differently,
the court did not inquire into whether the contractor was likely
to play hardball and hold Envirotech to the quoted design.
108. The way in which the court distinguished the RCA decision indicates
that the court's bright-line rule is a clear departure from the precedented pol-
icy-based analysis. The Envirotech court distinguished RCA on two grounds.
Id. at 1576, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at i234. The Federal Circuit noted first that En-
virotech specified an older design, rather than the improved design, in the bid
documents. In RCA, on the other hand, the bid documents contained a techni-
cal description that identified the patented invention. Id- The court's second
distinction was an extension of the first: Envirotech kept the patented inven-
tion confidential, while RCA disclosed its invention prior to the critical date.
Id What the court failed to note is that the RCA court specifically stated that
testimonial evidence of an intent to offer the patented invention may have
been sufficient to support that finding. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887
F.2d 1056, 1060, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The addi-
tional finding in RCA that the bid documents identified the patented invention
corroborated the testimonial evidence. Id.
109. See supra notes 93, 101-05 and accompanying text.




A situation where an inventor can easily affect a change in
the contract warrants a conclusion that the bid strategy impli-
cates the policy against pre-application exploitation. Envirotech
described its invention to the city's consulting engineer approx-
imately one month before making the offer."1 In so doing, En-
virotech's probable motive was to determine the engineer's
receptiveness to the new invention, because the engineer had
control over any changes to the project.113 If the engineer was
receptive, Envirotech could reasonably take the risk of its bid
strategy, because the risk of Envirotech's bid strategy seems to
depend directly upon the receptiveness of the government to
change the terms of the contract.1 4 Envirotech, by the very
fact that it used the bid strategy, indicated that it believed, at
the time of the offer, that the degree of risk of government in-
flexibility was low, or at least small enough to warrant the risk.
Furthermore, the apparent ease with which Envirotech ob-
tained the change" 5 indicates that Envirotech's assessment was
accurate, and it indicates also that the government customarily
grants such contract changes." 6 By not addressing the likeli-
hood of success of Envirotech's bid strategy, the Envirotech
112. I&. at 1573, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
113. It was the engineer for the city, Hill, who actually approved the design
change on September 17, 1980, from the older design as set forth in the con-
tract to the new invention. Id The prime contractor, Hooper, was apprised of
the change three weeks after the city's engineer had approved it. I& at 1573,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
114. It is also likely that the prime contractor, Hooper, had the power to
reject Envirotech's proposed design change. Hooper would probably be moti-
vated to reject the change for fear that any design change may push back the
scheduled completion of the project. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
Hooper did not object to the design change; thus, general contractor Hooper
either had no power to object to the change, or Hooper thought the change
desirable and one that would not affect time of completion.
115. It appears from the district court's opinion that Envirotech did not
even have to request such a change. The district court explained that En-
virotech, by letter, "clarified that the buoyant chamber called for in the speci-
fication had been replaced by a hydroballast." Envirotech Corp. v. Westech
Eng'g, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 372, 374, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804, 1805 (D. Utah
1989), rev'd, 904 F.2d 1571,15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It seems
that the contract may have allowed for such changes, and Envirotech merely
had to inform the government of the change.
116. Most savings that result from efficiency in performance must come
from contractors who are in the process of performing according to govern-
ment specifications. Thus, through typical value engineering clauses in gov-
ernment contracts, a contractor may suggest methods for performing more
economically by using his own resources to develop and submit value engi-
neering change proposals. See W. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER
THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION § 48.1, 693-95 (1986). Additionally,
typical "changes" clauses in government contracts authorize the government's
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court indicated that it likely would tolerate a lot of uncommun-
icated exploitation.
By creating its bright-line rule and ignoring the inventor's
uncommunicated exploitation, the Envirotech court allowed
Envirotech to exploit its invention in the same manner as RCA
and King Instruments had, yet without triggering the one-year
grace period. The totality of the circumstances warrants a find-
ing that Envirotech's sale activity implicated the policy against
pre-application exploitation. First, the price in Envirotech's fi-
nal offer did not reflect the cost of producing and delivering the
older design that it purported to offer. 7 An earlier offer re-
flected the cost of producing and delivering the older design.118
Before Envirotech's second offer, and still before the critical
date, Envirotech took steps to price its offer to reflect the cost
savings of supplying the new invention.- 9 Consequently, En-
virotech's offer was for $205,000 before the availability of the
improved design, and Envirotech reduced its offer to $134,000
after delivery of the improved design for this project became
feasible.120 Because of its invention, Envirotech gained a signif-
icant advantage - a $134,000 quote, as opposed to a $205,000
quote - in the bidding process. Because the existence of the
invention enabled Envirotech to price its offer much lower than
current technology would permit, Envirotech exploited the new
invention before the critical date.
In addition, the facts indicate that Envirotech had devel-
oped its invention to a degree sufficient to bid its improved de-
sign.121 Indeed, before making its offer, Envirotech stated that
no more testing of the patented design was necessary.m22 Thus,
contracting officer to make unilateral changes, in designated areas, within the
general scope of the contract. Id. § 43.11, at 629.
117. See supra note 89 (discussing the new design's cost savings over the
older design).
118. Envirotech's first offer was for $205,000. 713 F. Supp. at 373, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
119. For example, Envirotech obtained price quotes from concrete manu-
facturers who were to eventually produce the newly-designed concrete blocks
that were an important part of the patented invention. d. at 374, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
120. An internal Envirotech memorandum shows that the $134,000 quote
was based on the patented design at about a 10% margin. Envirotech Corp. v.
Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1575, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230, 1233 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), revg 713 F. Supp. 372, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (D. Utah 1989).
121. See supra note 34 (discussing the degree to which an invention must
be developed before sale activity can give rise to the on-sale bar).
122. The district court found that the invention "is rather straightforward
and its function can readily be calculated by persons with some engineering
1991] 1533
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
when making its offer, Envirotech probably believed that the
company would be able to deliver the new invention when per-
forming the contract with the offeree.ms
A patent attorney's opinion letter to Envirotech contains
additional evidence of impermissible exploitation. In the letter,
written approximately one month before the offer, the attorney
stated that Envirotech's bid would be the first offer for sale.124
Even though, as the Federal Circuit notes, the attorney proba-
bly had not seen the precise terms of Envirotech's offer,2S the
letter does evidence the fact that the invention was ready to be
offered for sale and that Envirotech was considering doing just
that. This evidence further supports the conclusion that, con-
sidering the totality of the circumstances, Envirotech definitely
offered, and thus attempted to exploit, its invention by making
an executory sales offer.
B. THE POLICY AGAINST DETRIMNTAL PUBLIC RELIANCE
An offeree is not the only party who may come to believe
that an invention is freely available, thus implicating the policy
against detrimental public reliance. Sale activity implicates the
policy whenever any persons in the public, not just prospective
purchasers, may come to believe by virtue of their knowledge
of the sale activity that the invention is freely available126
Taking a narrow and unprecedented view of the policy, the En-
virotech court considered only whether the offeree could have
come to believe that the invention was freely available.'2 7
The Federal Circuit stated that it limited its inquiry to only
prospective purchasers because the district court based its ap-
background. The inventors themselves indicated on their Invention Record
that there was no need for testing it to predict how it would function." 713 F.
Supp. at 376, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
123. The fact that Envirotech actually delivered the patented invention to
the city while performing the contract further supports this conclusion. 713 F.
Supp. at 374, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (stating that "[tihe digester cover
used at the ... project embodies all of the limitations of all of the relevant
claims of the.., patent"). It seems peculiar that the Federal Circuit did not
even mention this fact in its opinion.
124. 904 F.2d at 1573, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
125. Id at 1576, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
126. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
127. When addressing the policy against detrimental public reliance, the
court began with the conclusion that "the 'public' that is, Hooper and the
other general contractors that received Envirotech's May 8 proposal, could not
have come to believe that the hydroballaster was freely available based upon




plication of the on-sale bar specifically on Envirotech's offer to
sell to these persons.' 2 8 Envirotech also disclosed the invention
to both the engineer working for the city and the cement con-
tractors before the bid and the critical date.'2 These persons
were aware that Envirotech was going to bid on the project. In
choosing not to analyze these third parties' detrimental reli-
ance, the court distinguished between actual offerees and per-
sons who are aware that an offer for sale was made. An offer
for sale, however, can cause a third party to reasonably believe
that the invention is freely available in the same way it causes
an actual offeree to so believe. Thus, the court's distinction is
not a solid foundation for limiting the detrimental public reli-
ance inquiry.33°
Even if the Federal Circuit had made the proper inquiry,
the court still may have found that neither the city engineer
nor the cement contractors could have believed reasonably that
the invention was freely available. Envirotech, through either
a confidentiality agreement or a more direct communication,
probably indicated to the city's engineer and to the cement con-
tractors that the invention was not freely available. The ab-
sence of detrimental public reliance as a policy rationale,
however, does not negate the persuasiveness of the implication
128. Il Even with respect to the facts of its limited inquiry, the Federal
Circuit's analysis appears to be flawed. For instance, the Federal Circuit noted
that the district court had made the finding that Envirotech had intended to
exploit its invention "'whether or not the [city engineer or the prime contrac-
tore] had actual knowledge of it."' Id. (quoting district court opinion, En-
virotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 372, 375, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1804, 1806 (D. Utah 1989), rev'd, 904 F.2d 1571, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1230 (Fed. Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original). The Federal Circuit took this
finding to suggest that neither the city engineer nor the offeree "was suffi-
ciently aware of the [invention] to justifiably believe that it was freely avail-
able." Id. The court's conclusion does not logically flow from the district
court's holding. The district court, however, only held that it was immaterial,
as the King Instrument case also held, whether the offeree had actual knowl-
edge of the patented invention, not that there was no actual knowledge. See
Envirotech, 713 F. Supp. at 375, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806 (citing King In-
strument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 407
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing In re Blaisdell 242 F.2d 779, 783, 44 C.C.P.A. 846, 850,
113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289, 292 (1957)), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986)); see also
supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting that under pre-existing law, it
was unnecessary for the district court to make a finding regarding the actual
knowledge of the prospective purchaser).
129. See supra note 99.
130. In addition, there are many on-sale situations where the inventor does
not directly contact the purchaser - e.g., the invention on sale in a store.
These situations too may just as likely create detrimental public reliance in
persons aware of the on-sale status, but not directly solicited.
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of the policy against pre-application exploitation or the policy
favoring early invention disclosures.1 3 '
C. THE PoLIcY FAVORING EARLY INVENTION DIscLosuREs
Although the Federal Circuit mentioned the policy encour-
aging the prompt, widespread disclosure of inventions,'132 the
court did not address that policy in its opinion.133 Furthermore,
the court omitted an analysis of evidence that best proves an
implication of the policy encouraging early invention disclo-
sures: the degree to which the invention was reduced to prac-
tice when Envirotech made its offer.134 The court stated that,
because Westech did not prove the threshold "objective mani-
festation of intent to make a definite offer" requirement, the
court did not need to determine the degree to which the inven-
tor, at the time of the offer, had developed the invention.135
Because the degree to which an inventor has developed his or
her invention relates directly to whether a patent application
will provide an accurate disclosure, the court's failure to ad-
dress the "reduction to practice" issue illustrates the court's
disregard for the policy favoring early disclosures.
Envirotech's facts demonstrate that Envirotech's sale activ-
ity implicates this policy. Envirotech had fully developed its in-
vention before the critical date,'36 which indicates a much-
reduced danger of a defective invention disclosure in the pat-
ent. Thus, the likelihood of an accurate invention disclosure
should have encouraged the court to determine that En-
virotech's sale activity implicated the policy encouraging early
patent disclosures.
D. THE PoLIcY GIVING THE INVENTOR TIME BEFORE FILING
Commentators may argue that the grant to the inventor of
an additional grace period was equitable on the facts of En-
131. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
132. 904 F.2d at 1574, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
133. See supra note 105.
134. See supra notes 50-51 (discussing fact that courts recognize that the
policy encouraging early invention disclosures is only implicated when the sale
activity respects an invention that has been developed to a degree where a dis-
closure of the invention will be an accurate one that will not mislead other
inventors).
135. 904 F.2d at 1577 n.*, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234 n.*; see supra note
105.
136. See supra note 122.
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virotech.'37 After all, the inventor did provide the public with
the benefits of, and the science behind, the invention.-sa En-
virotech's sale activity occurred only twenty-two days before
the critical date,-39 and compared with the seventeen-year pat-
ent grant, twenty-two days seems rather trivial. Additionally,
because Envirotech filed its patent application one year after
the date of disclosure,'-4 Envirotech and its patent counsel ap-
parently believed that disclosure, not the executory sales offer
twenty-two days earlier, triggered the running of the grace pe-
riod. Moreover, in 1980, when the patent was filed and before
the creation of the Federal Circuit, their belief regarding the
state of on-sale bar law was probably reasonable.14' Lastly, the
equities disfavor alleged infringers, who are, in a sense,
tortfeasors.' 42 Admittedly then, the Federal Circuit faced a dif-
ficult situation: save the patent by granting an additional grace
period, or invoke the on-sale bar and thereby invalidate the pat-
ent because of an apparently innocent twenty-two day
extension.
Despite these arguments, Congress statutorily set the grace
137. See, eg., Choate, supra note 3, at 917 (noting that "it would seem that
the courts could consider this same policy and avoid holdings which penalize
early attempts at establishing commerce which do not result in actual delivery
or commercial installation").
138. As Professor Choate states, "[i]t must be remembered that many of
these cases involve one party who is using the 'on sale' defense to obtain im-
munity from a patent right granted to an inventor who at least has endeavored
to add to the world's knowledge of practical devices and to get a new product
on the market." Id at 918.
139. See supmr note 92.
140. Id. More precisely, the Federal Circuit noted that:
[O]n May 30, 1980, Envirotech disclosed a detailed description of its
[invention] to [the city's engineer] as part of a required pre-award sub-
mittal. Envirotech acknowledged that it had "suggested" its innova-
tive approach to [the city's engineer] "during the formative stages of
this job" but now included as part of the submittal both a description
and detailed drawings of the [invention]: how it would operate and be
constructed as well as the advantages it possessed over the [older,
quoted] design.
Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1573, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1230, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 1990), revg 713 F. Supp. 372, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1804 (D. Utah 1989). The inventors applied for a patent on their invention on
May 29, 1981, one year after the complete disclosure. Id. at 1573, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1232.
141. See Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that the Federal Circuit's ap-
proach to the on-sale bar issue has not been pro-patentee and that the Federal
Circuit rejects simplistic interpretations of the on-sale bar rule that may bene-
fit the inventor).
142. See supra note 138.
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period at one year.143 Any extension of the grace period, even
by a single day, runs contrary to the statute.144 Thus, whether
the pre-application exploitation occurred twenty-two days or
ten years before the critical date is immaterial. Congress set
the grace period at one year, and the federal courts do not have
the equitable powers to alter that determination.145
Moreover, Envirotech's sale activity did not deserve the
protection of an additional grace period. Envirotech admitted
that it was through testing its invention;14 therefore, the sale
activity did not constitute an experimental use.147 Thus, the ex-
ecutory sales offer did not deserve an additional grace period on
that ground. Furthermore, Envirotech cannot argue for an ad-
ditional grace period on the ground that it was only trying to
test the market for its invention, because the Federal Circuit
does not give market testing an additional grace period.148
Finally, the equities in Envirotech do not entirely favor the
inventor; Envirotech reaped the benefits of its invention, partic-
ularly in the sale at issue in the case, without competition for
ten years. The Federal Circuit, therefore, should have found
because the grace period is statutorily set at one year En-
virotech's executory sales offer did not implicate the policy
granting the inventor a grace period.
E. THE POLICY BALANCE
In the Envirotech case, the implication of the policy against
pre-application exploitation, by itself, warranted the application
of the on-sale bar. 49 The implication of the policy encouraging
early invention disclosures lends additional support to applica-
tion of the bar. 5 0 The result is the same regardless of whether
143. See supra note 24.
144. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing the tension
between the antitrust laws and the patent grant and noting that this tension
warrants strict adherence to the term of the patent grant).
145. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The
Court, here, held that the plain language of the Endangered Species Act,
which provided for no exceptions, required prohibiting the completion of a
dam, which if completed, would have caused the extinction of the snail darter,
despite the fact that the Court's result required the sacrifice of the anticipated
benefits of the project and of many millions of dollars in public funds. See id-
at 172-73.
146. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 35, 59 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Envirotech's sale activity implicated the policy of avoiding det-
rimental public reliance.' 5 ' Finally, the policy giving the inven-
tor a grace period does not negate the on-sale status of the
executory sale offer because Envirotech's sale activity did not
implicate this policy.'5 2 Thus, if the Federal Circuit had en-
gaged in a true, policy-based on-sale bar analysis, it would have
affirmed the district court's application of the bar.
CONCLUSION
The increasing number of cases before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit involving the on-sale
bar to patentability in the context of an executory sales offer
reflects the uncertainty inherent in issues decided on their sup-
portive policy rationales. In Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Engi-
neering, Inc., the Federal Circuit diverged from its well-
established, policy-based analytical framework for the on-sale
bar and created a restrictive bright-line rule that an inventor's
attempted exploitation must be manifested objectively in a defi-
nite offer to sell the patented invention. Because Envirotech's
formal offer disclosed an older design, rather than the new in-
vention, the court used its new "objective manifestation of in-
tent to make a definite offer" requirement to refuse to apply
the on-sale bar, without even considering the totality of the cir-
cumstances. In so doing, the Federal Circuit ignored the inven-
tor's admitted intent to exploit the patented invention before
the critical date.
This Comment argues that the Federal Circuit's strict use
of the "objective manifestation of intent to make a definite of-
fer" requirement is a step in the wrong direction in on-sale bar
jurisprudence. The requirement gives inventors the opportu-
nity to engage in subversive bid strategies with anti-competitive
results. This Comment urges, therefore, that the Federal Cir-
cuit adhere to its well-established, policy-based analytical
framework.
Stephen R. Schaefer
151. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
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